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Abstract
The conceptual, and more recently empirical, study
of compliance has become a central preoccupation,
and perhaps the fastest growing subfield, in
international legal scholarship. The authors seek to
question this trend. They argue that looking at the
aspirations of international law through the lens of
rule compliance leads to inadequate scrutiny and
understanding of the diverse complex purposes and
projects that multiple actors impose and transpose on
international legality, and especially a tendency to
oversimplify if not distort the relation of inter-
national law to politics. Citing a range of examples
from different areas of international law – ranging
widely from international trade and investment to
international criminal and humanitarian law – the
authors seek to show how the concept of compliance
(especially viewed as rule observance) is inadequate
for understanding how international law has
normative effects. A fundamental flaw of compliance
studies is that they abstract from the problem of
interpretation: interpretation is pervasively deter-
minative of what happens to legal rules when they
are out in the world, yet ‘compliance’ studies begin
with the notion that there is a stable and agreed
meaning to a rule, and we need merely to observe
whether it is obeyed.
Policy Implications
• Looking at the aspirations of international law
through the lens of rule compliance leads to inade-
quate scrutiny and understanding of the diverse
complex purposes and projects that multiple actors
impose and transpose on international legality, and
especially a tendency to oversimplify if not distort
the relation of international law to politics.
• States, as well as other actors – corporations for
example – instead of simply ‘complying’ with
international legal rules may bargain in light of
them, and around them. Given that there are
transaction costs of negotiating, the rules will
have an effect on the bargain, but one that will
not be observed if what one is focused on is rule
compliance.
• In altering the focus and agenda of states and
nonstate actors in dealing with conflict and post-
conflict transitions, international law may have
raised expectations too high that where politics
and economics, and for that matter moral ideal-
ism, have failed to solve enduring human prob-
lems, law will succeed.
• International law may create benchmarks for a
wide range of private decision making, and this
even when in the first instance the rules in ques-
tion have not been explicitly addressed, at least
not traditionally to nonstate actors. Such bench-
marks may affect to whom firms lend, with whom
they deal as suppliers or subcontractors, design
specifications for products such as ships and air-
craft, the terms of such diverse transactions as the
adoption of children, the transportation of haz-
ardous products and the transfer of high technol-
ogy. Private actors may simply adopt these
benchmarks as common terms of commerce
regardless of the extent to which they have been
‘implemented’ by states.
• International law (norms and ⁄ or institutions such
as courts and tribunals) may shift in whole or in
part decision-making, interpretative and ⁄ or legiti-
mating power from one set of elite actors to
another (for example from diplomats, foreign
policy analysts and military planners to legal
professionals such as judges, lawyers and law pro-
fessors).
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Traditionally, in most fields of legal study, the question of
why, how and to what extent the actors bound by legal
rules comply with them has been a secondary, if not mar-
ginal, one for scholarly inquiry by jurists. Law and eco-
nomics and legal sociology, as well as realist approaches
such as Critical Legal Studies, have focused greater atten-
tion on the actual behavioral effects of rules. But such
approaches have a much broader focus than the specific
question of rule compliance.
International law is a striking exception: the conceptual,
and more recently empirical, study of compliance has
become a central preoccupation, and perhaps the fastest
growing subfield, in international legal scholarship, engag-
ing some of the best minds in the discipline (see Bradford,
2004). Indeed (and perhaps the most striking or extreme
example is Andrew Guzman) there are those who insist
that explaining compliance is a central test or criterion for
the adequacy of any general theory of international law:
‘[C]ompliance is one of the most central questions in inter-
national law. Without a theory of compliance, we cannot
examine the role of treaties, customary international law, or
other agreements. Nor can we consider how to improve the
functioning of the international legal system, or develop a
workable theory of international legal and regulatory coop-
eration’ (Guzman, 2002, p. 1826).
The objective of this essay is to put in question the focus
on compliance in much recent international law scholar-
ship. In our view, this focus obfuscates the character of
international legal normativity, tending to ignore the cen-
trality of interpretation to the generation of legal meaning,
as well as the horizontal relation between diverse norms
and regimes (‘fragmentation’). Looking at the aspirations of
international law through the lens of rule compliance leads
to inadequate scrutiny and understanding of the diverse
complex purposes and projects that multiple actors impose
and transpose on international legality, and especially a ten-
dency to oversimplify if not distort the relation of interna-
tional law to politics.
As Benedict Kingsbury has observed, the recent emphasis
on compliance in legal scholarship has been accompanied by
little critical thought about the meaning of the concept of
‘compliance’ and the work it is supposed to do in any theo-
retical account of international law. As Kingsbury shows, a
‘compliance-based theory of international law’ is an impos-
sibility since conceptions of the meaning and significance
of compliance depend on prior theoretical or conceptual
constructs about the nature of international law and – we
ourselves would add – of law generally (Kingsbury, 1998).
In the first part of the article, we attempt to explore the
question of what thinking about compliance can contribute
to our understanding of international law in general and
the limits of this contribution. We conclude that although
the importance of compliance to an overall understanding
or theory of international law is less than is often assumed
in the literature, there is nevertheless a strong case for
studying the real world effects of international law, for
much the same reasons as in other fields as well.
In the second part, we argue that, nonetheless, the
notion of rule compliance is much too narrow an angle of
vision to comprehend international law’s normative effects.
In this part, we seek to sketch a broader framework for
understanding these effects, which places considerable
emphasis on interpretation and cross-regime impact, ele-
ments that are often lost or given inadequate emphasis in
compliance studies. Here we build on the work of scholars
such as Ryan Goodman, Derick Jinks and Beth Simmons,
who are concerned with the effects of international legal
rules, but understand these effects in a broader and more
subtle way than is connoted by notions of rule compliance
or ‘enforcement’ (Goodman, 2001; Jinks and Goodman,
2003; Simmons, 2009). Finally we consider the significance
of the expanded discourse of international law once there is
a shift in terms of the debate over compliance.
1. Debating the meaning of compliance for
international law
One reason that compliance is often seen as a central prob-
lem for international legal scholarship is the challenge (by
realists and some but not all positivists)1 that law is only
really law when accompanied by authoritative interpretation
and enforcement (see Morgenthau, 1948). A focus on com-
pliance, or more adequately perhaps obedience (see Henkin,
1968), aims to deflect such a claim by asserting that there
is a range of considerations including reputational effects ⁄
long-term self-interest that lead to compliance with inter-
national law, regardless of the absence of authoritative
interpretation and enforcement in most instances.
Such a response at once proves too much and too little.
There are many domestic laws that attract widespread non-
compliance despite significant sanctions (drug laws and tax
laws in many jurisdictions)2 and others that attract wide-
spread compliance even though sanctions and monitoring
are relatively lax (seatbelt laws); thus the positivist claim is
already weak, if not incoherent, if the heart of the positivist
claim is the identification of the existence of authoritative
interpretation and enforcement with actual compliance.3
But the positivist claim may at its root be conceptual: a
formal, definitional property of law (as opposed to other
normative systems, religion, morality, social and familial
custom) is that ‘law’ is the binding edict of a sovereign
with coercive force, at least in principle, over the subjects
to whom the legal commands are addressed. If this is so,
then even if actual rates of compliance with international
law were superior to those for norms that are commands of
a sovereign with a monopoly of violence over the subjects
of law, demonstrating this would not itself be an answer to
the positivist objection. Indeed, many forms of normativity,
including customs and etiquette within particular subpoliti-
cal communities, exhibit very high rates of compliance or
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obedience, and the positivist has a point in that this does
not, in ordinary language, induce us to call them ‘laws’. It
is worth noting however that one of the most sophisticated
positivist accounts of law, that of H. L. A. Hart, rejects
the notion that legal obligation implies effective coercive
sanctions, specifically informed by a consideration of inter-
national law. According to Hart,
To argue that international law is not binding
because of its lack of organized sanctions is tacitly
to accept the analysis of obligation contained in
the theory that law is essentially a matter of orders
backed by threats. This theory, as we have seen,
identifies ‘having an obligation’ or ‘being bound’
with ‘likely to suffer the sanction or punishment
threatened for disobedience’. Yes, as we have
argued, this identification distorts the role played
in all legal thought and discourse of the ideas of
obligation and duty (Hart, 1961, pp. 217–218).
In addition, as Kratochwil has argued, as distinguishing
‘law’ from other forms of social ordering is not a simple
matter, it is questionable whether and to what extent the
existence of authoritative interpretation and enforcement
can be defended as decisive or even the most important
formal properties of law (Kratochwil, 1989, pp. 187ff.).
Historically, such a view may reflect the function of law as
an agent of rationalization, centralization and secularization
of authority in the period that could crudely be described
as the rise of the modern nation state (Tocqueville, 2001;
Unger, 1976; Weber, 1978). Why should international law
have to defend itself before the bar of such a definition of
law? Instead, might not the very proliferation of norms
labeled international law in our own, very different era
affect how we approach the meaning of legality?
As early as the 1940s, the French-Russian philosopher
Alexandre Kojeve discerned the internal tension between
the positivist idea of sovereignty and the positivist concep-
tion of law as effective coercion. Granting to positivist or
behaviorist approaches that law to be fully law must pos-
sess, in principle, irresistible force to compel its subjects,
Kojeve noted that these subjects and their activities fre-
quently exceed the territorial bounds of the sovereign; thus,
purely domestic law is not fully law, against the positivist’s
own criterion, since its (in principle) irresistible force ends
at the border; only global law can become fully law, since it
is capable of recognition by all sovereigns and thus can
become (in principle) irresistible everywhere that the per-
sons and activities that are its subjects may be situated
(Kojeve, 2007). Thus, one could actually consider interna-
tional law in the perspective of the limits of the domestic
law paradigm with respect to compliance.
A second, and certainly understandable, reason for focus-
ing on compliance is that there are some international legal
norms that have reciprocity as their fundamental normative
and ⁄ or functional premise. An obvious example is that of
peace or disarmament treaties. The nightmare scenario of
one party innocently disarming pursuant to the obligations
of the treaty while the other secretly builds up its arsenals,
acquiring a decisive strategic advantage, has often fuelled
skepticism about the capacity of international law to solve
the ‘security dilemma’. International trade treaties also have
significant reciprocity dimensions. Here an analogy may be
drawn to nonsimultaneous contractual performance; general
compliance studies may yield some insights into the mech-
anisms or devices – monitoring, verification, third party
guarantees, self-help ⁄ retaliation – that are available to
address the problem. Yet the current compliance focus in
international legal scholarship is not especially preoccupied
with these issues; at least as much attention if not more is
given to multilateral human rights treaties, which do not
pose this kind of challenge or dilemma.
A third, not unrelated, reason why compliance has often
been emphasized in contemporary scholarship may relate to
the concern to counter or refute realist or ‘skeptical’ posi-
tions that international law does not really matter, because
the ultimate causes of state behavior are to be found in
self-interest, not legal obligation. Here, emphasizing com-
pliance has at least two drawbacks. The first is that such an
emphasis reflects a too quick concession to the way the
realists ⁄ skeptics frame the test for whether international law
matters. The second, and obviously closely related, is that
if one concedes the realist ⁄ skeptic test, then showing real
world normative effects will never be enough to meet it.
Let us use the position of Jack Goldsmith and Eric
Posner to illustrate this claim. Goldsmith and Posner argue
that most cited examples of obedience to international law
are cases where to do so is in the self-interest, either short
or long term, of the complying state. They suggest that
these cases somehow do not really ‘count’ as a demonstra-
tion that international law is an effective legal system.
Goldsmith and Posner do acknowledge that international
law can provide useful communication and coordination
mechanisms where states seek to cooperate on the basis of
mutual or reciprocal self-interest, but that it cannot compel
obedience against interests.
It is a curious criterion for the validity or even effective-
ness of a legal system that it should routinely command
obedience from legal subjects against their individual inter-
ests. Since lawfulness is often an endogenous preference
of individuals and indeed of sovereigns,4 and since as
Goldsmith and Posner themselves observe, law itself can
give rise to ‘self-interested’ reasons for compliance (e.g.
reputational effects), it is unclear how any empirical study
could ever prove that compliance to law is exclusively or
decisively undertaken contrary to perceived self-interest.
Why should it matter to do so? This question is as perti-
nent for domestic as for international law. Kant, for one,
defined ‘law’ (Recht) in contradistinction to moral virtue as
requiring only external obedience, not a habit of mind that
Beyond Compliance
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compels compliance from duty alone, regardless of heteron-
omous considerations (Kant, 1996). In some contexts, law
may serve an important function in constraining compul-
sive, passionate or impulsive behavior that will often be
contrary to the long-term self-interest of the legal subjects
in question, based upon at least their first order preferences
(see Sunstein, 1997). In other contexts, even where the law
has coercive state apparatus at its disposal (police, prisons,
etc.) it has been suggested to be often ineffective in con-
straining such behavior (e.g. violence by socially disempow-
ered young men) since deterrence through the threat of
punishment itself supposes some ability to take into
account future consequences.
While compliance cannot solve these kinds of objections
to international law and its relevance, understanding com-
pliance is obviously important if we care about whether the
law realizes its purposes, that is, on any nonformalist,
instrumentalist view of law, whether law and economics or
critical legal studies or moral and political theories of law
of a perfectionist character.
But here what we are interested in is the impact of the
law in all respects, and compliance, unless one stretches the
ordinary meaning of the word to breaking point, is much
too narrow a lens for conceiving the wide range of effects
that can be produced by international law. Why interna-
tional law matters cannot be tested simply by examining
‘compliance’ in any of its common senses (conformity or
obedience to rules or even transformation of state conduct
in a manner that conduces to the purposes of the rules).
The effects of norms, including legal norms, have an
inherent complexity that, as Ruggie explains, defies the
positivist aspiration to link norms causally to discrete
behavioral acts:
Norms may ‘guide’ behavior, they may ‘inspire’
behavior, they may ‘rationalize’ or ‘justify’ behavior,
they may express ‘mutual expectations’ about
behavior, or they may be ignored. But they do not
effect cause in the sense that a bullet through the
heart causes death or an uncontrolled surge in the
money supply causes inflation … The impact of
norms within international regimes is not a passive
process, which can be ascertained analogously to
that of Newtonian laws governing the collision of
two bodies. Precisely, because state behavior within
regimes is interpreted by other states, the rationales
and justifications for behavior that are proffered,
together with pleas for understanding or admis-
sions of guilt, as well as the responsiveness of such
reasoning on the part of other states, all are abso-
lutely critical component parts of any explanation
involving the efficacy of norms. Indeed, such com-
municative dynamics may tell us far more about
how robust a regime is than overt behavior alone
(Ruggie, 1998, pp. 97–98, emphasis in original).
2. Moving beyond compliance
The following are some of the possible effects of interna-
tional law that are not captured by the notion of behavioral
‘compliance’ with a ‘rule’ of law and not tested by studies
that look only for rule compliance, or some surrogate for
it, such as outcomes shifting in the direction supposedly
sought by the rules.
• International law (norms and ⁄ or institutions such as
courts and tribunals) may shift in whole or in part decision-
making, interpretative and ⁄ or legitimating power from one
set of elite actors to another (for example from diplomats,
foreign policy analysts and military planners to legal profes-
sionals such as judges, lawyers and law professors). This
effect is autonomous from that of compliance: in some
cases, legal professionalization may lead to more compli-
ance, and in some cases less. In others, it could even lead to
‘ultracompliance’: effects which go beyond what is desired
from the perspective of the objectives of the legal regime,
and which may even be perverse.5
• Adhesion to international legal norms and ⁄ or per-
ceived compliance with them may be used as a basis for
admitting states to a ‘club’ with privileges, as it were; char-
acterizations of certain states as ‘outlaw’, ‘rogue’ or ‘scoff-
law’ regimes serve to justify the exclusion of such states
from more favorable treatment offered to others, and to
legitimate harsher, more forceful diplomatic, political and
military strategies in relation to the ‘outsider’ states. This is
an effect that is considered in relation to compliance by
Goodman and Jinks, for instance. However, it may have
significant implications that go beyond whether the pros-
pect of membership can help induce compliance, affecting
the capacity of individuals from those states to travel and
trade, for example, or determinations of refugee status, or
the perceived political risk of foreign direct investment.
Goldsmith and Posner acknowledge this effect in referring
to the ‘standard of civilization’ function of human rights
treaties; but curiously they appear to dismiss this function
as an indicator that international human rights law matters,
since (contrary to what Jinks and Goodman, 2003, specu-
late) in deploying their reductive perspective it does not as
such lead to ‘compliance’.
• International law can affect the way that policy makers
view international problems and conflicts (for example in
terms of clashes of rights as opposed to balancing of polit-
ical or economic interests) and their perception of the
constituencies to whom they are accountable in addressing
such problems and conflicts. In the Balkans, resolving the
conflict, and building post-conflict societies, somehow
became identified with the prosecution of crimes against
humanity at the International Criminal Tribunal for the
former Yugoslavia (ICTY). The role that international
criminal law could play in achieving these goals was
arguably exaggerated, leading to a relative neglect of other
processes, such as local truth commissions, the building of
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grass-roots democratic institutions and the reconstruction
of civil society (Teitel, 1999). In the case of the 2006 Leb-
anon war, the complex security issues raised by Hezbollah’s
entrenchment in Lebanon and the role of Syria were over-
shadowed in public discourse by claims and counterclaims
concerning the commission of war crimes by either or both
sides during the conflict. The broad political and economic
considerations that might be served by integrating Serbia
into the European Union have been almost entirely over-
shadowed by the concern that Serbia has failed adequately
to cooperate with the ICTY prosecution of war criminals.
Indeed, compliance has become the central issue with
respect to Serbian accession to the EU, where ‘compliance’
with international law is viewed as a surrogate for or
symbol of political ‘cooperation’.
Despite the commitment to positivism, the application
of pre-existing law according to criminal justice principles
and concepts, the tribunals have also reflected ‘teleological
goals’6 including broader, noncriminal justice goals such as
peace, etc. in the region.7 As the ICTY appellate chamber
held in a sentencing ruling, the law applied ‘must serve
broader normative purposes in light of its social, political
and economic role’.
Consider what compliance might mean in the context of
the International Criminal Court (ICC). In this regard,
just how important is the fact of signatories turning defen-
dants over to the ICC as indicia of ‘compliance’? Or, might
‘compliance’ be evaluated through analyzing a complex set
of behaviors in a longer time frame: commitment to the
norms themselves via the act of signing (see Jinks and
Goodman, 2003, on joining human rights treaty regimes;
see also Simmons, 2009); incorporating these norms via
legislating into domestic law, the embarking on prosecu-
tions policy in domestic courts, for example UK trials of
their soldiers in Iraq; or cooperating with other countries
in their prosecutions via a variety of actions including
rendition and extradition, for example Chile’s extradition
of Fujimori back to his home country to face rights charges
(see Romero, 2007). The normative and positive law inno-
vations triggered by the establishment of and commitment
to the ICC might thus lead to prosecutions of a kind never
contemplated by the jurisdiction of the Court itself, such as
for crimes committed in the distant past. This is a clear
instance of ultracompliance. Furthermore, the sense in
which there is a layered normativity can be seen in the
importance of the behavior of nonsignatories whose behav-
ior may nevertheless be shaped by the legal regime in ques-
tion. Thus, a compliance-driven theory does not capture
US actions in embarking upon prosecutions policies in the
orbit of the ICC.
• By transforming policies into legal norms, interna-
tional law may reinforce those policies in the presence of
indeterminacy and controversy concerning their effects and
their substantive rationales (the ‘constitutionalization’ of
elements of the Washington Consensus in World Trade
Organization (WTO) law). Thus instead of changing
behavior directly, international legal norms here may make
it more possible or less costly for a state to adhere to an
existing or recently adopted policy course, despite increas-
ing internal disagreement and dissent concerning the merits
of that policy course. Thus Goodman (2002, pp. 540ff.),
Moravcsik (2000) and Simmons (2009) have pointed out
that acceptance of or creation of international or transna-
tional human rights norms may serve to ‘lock in’ a transi-
tion to democracy and the ‘rule of law’, increasing the costs
of resistance or reversion. These observations vindicate Jon
Elster’s (2000) notion that precommitment is never about
tying one’s own hands but rather someone else’s, in this
case elements within a transitional society who may seek a
return to authoritarianism. Precommitment can fulfill the
expressive function of reinforcing the beliefs of citizens that
there is no turning back and that as exemplified in interna-
tional norms the policy choice chosen has a universal force
– or at least that ‘world history’ is on the side of the transi-
tion. This example points to an internal difficulty within
the ‘compliance’ perspective. Goldsmith and Posner (2006,
p. 121), for example, maintain that unlike ratification of
human rights treaties, ‘democracy, peace and economic
development’ have been shown to enhance human rights
protection; however, this contrast assumes that democracy,
peace and economic development occur entirely exoge-
nously of the effects of international human rights law. If,
as just suggested, international human rights law helps to
lock in transitions to peaceful democratic conditions, then
it may ultimately lead to what is usually conceived of as
compliance, but only through a normative effect that is
caught in the first instances by focusing on something
other than rule compliance.
• International law may create benchmarks for a wide
range of private decision making, and this even when in
the first instance the rules in question have not been
explicitly addressed, at least not traditionally to nonstate
actors. Such benchmarks may affect to whom firms lend,
with whom they deal as suppliers or subcontractors, design
specifications for products such as ships and aircraft, the
terms of such diverse transactions as the adoption of chil-
dren, the transportation of hazardous products and the
transfer of high technology. Private actors may simply
adopt these benchmarks as common terms of commerce
regardless of the extent to which they have been ‘imple-
mented’ by states. Thus, here again, the notion of ‘compli-
ance’ (generally focused on state compliance) does not fully
capture the normative effect.
• Conversely, the transnational customs or norms of
nonstate actors or institutions that are dominated by non-
state actors may become ‘international law’ through being
legalized in a treaty process; the example of the Technical
Barriers to Trade Agreement in the WTO, which creates a
legal obligation on states to use international standards
(often promulgated by nonstate organizations) for
Beyond Compliance
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mandatory regulations is a telling one. Here, looking at
state compliance tells only a small part of the story of the
effects of strengthening the norm through ‘legalization’ on
the actual operation of markets, consumer choice, etc. (these
kinds of effects, that move between as it were public and
private transnational behavior and public and private norm
setting and interpretation, have begun to receive attention
through the Global Administrative Law project, led by
Kingsbury, Richard Stewart and their collaborators. See also
the analysis of international and transnational securities
regulation by Claire Kelly and Roberta Karmel (2009)).
• Quite beyond being formally implemented in domestic
legal rules, international law may affect the interpretation of
domestic law. Viewing such interpretation simply as part
and parcel of ‘compliance’ is inadequate or limiting. The
invocation of international law in the interpretative process
can serve a variety of jurisprudential purposes which may
have little to do with ‘compliance’ with the international
rule (see Teitel, 2004). Indeed, using an international legal
norm for interpretative purposes may give a reading or
effect to such a norm that is different from that which the
agents of an international regime may have intended,
assuming one could ascertain such an intention. Important
normative effects may occur through cross-regime inter-
pretation. Ignorance of such effects may lead to serious
underestimation of the influence of particular legal regimes
or institutions. For example, international environmental
law, including soft law, has shaped the way in which the
WTO Appellate Body has interpreted norms of inter-
national trade law in a number of cases (Howse, 2008).
Koskenniemi observes:
A legal regime such as the European or Inter-
American human rights convention makes
constant reference to general international law
without any act of incorporation. The Interna-
tional Criminal Tribunals on the former Yugosla-
via and Rwanda are all the time applying law that
comes from beyond their constituent instruments.
Tribunals having to deal with State contracts with
foreign companies frequently fill gaps and solve
inconsistencies by reference to something like a
natural law of the transnational commercial sys-
tem. Even when the law appears to step aside so
as to give room for political expediency – as argu-
ably happened in the Lockerbie case in 1992 where
the International Court of Justice affirmed that
Security Council decisions override the rights of
States under particular treaties – this took place as
an inference from Article 103 of the UN Charter
(Koskenniemi, 2007, p. 8).
While Eric Posner, an international legal scholar heavily
focused on compliance, tends to dismiss the influence of
the International Court of Justice (ICJ), based on the num-
ber of judgments it has emitted and their purportedly dis-
tant effects on the controversies decided (Posner, 2004),
the jurisprudential acquis of the ICJ on such essential ques-
tions as state responsibility, countermeasures and treaty
interpretation has been repeatedly invoked, in for example,
investor–state arbitrations, characterized by compulsory
jurisdiction and a ‘hard law’ remedy, that is, monetary
damages that can be enforced in domestic court. Along
similar lines, sources such as the European Convention on
Human Rights and its interpretation by the European
Court of Human Rights have been used by investor–state
tribunals.
Another illustration of the growing area reflecting the
influence of international law is seen in the contemporary
controversy over the importation of international law in
interpretations of domestic constitutional law, e.g. Roper v.
Simmons, and Lawrence v. Texas where the United States
Supreme Court referred to a number of opinions interpret-
ing analogous provisions in international covenants for
their ‘confirmatory’ value.
• Rather obviously legal agents bargain in the shadow of
the law. We have already mentioned how international law
may shape or affect the terms of bargains or transactions
between nonstate actors, who are not even directly bound
by the rules in question. States, instead of simply ‘comply-
ing’ with international legal rules may bargain in light of
them, and around them. The rules will shape the bargain-
ing, and thus have an effect, but one that will not be
observed if what one is focused on is rule compliance. Once
again, ‘compliance-based’ theories of international law do
not really have an analytic for understanding such settle-
ments: are they really to be thought of as noncompliance
(since the parties have adopted a solution that deviates
from the given rule in some respects or may be driven to
settle out of uncertainty as to whether even if the legal
claim is good the other party will comply)? While under
the influence of the Coase theorem, domestic law and eco-
nomics scholars have examined many contexts where, given
transaction costs, background legal rules affect the shape of
bargains, the analysis of how international legal rules affect
interstate settlements has largely been neglected. (One
exception is the work of Busch and Reinhardt (2001) on
why countries settle disputes within the WTO legal frame-
work). As is illustrated by the Canada–US softwood lum-
ber dispute, uncertainty about compliance can be a major
factor in inducing a settlement (in that case uncertainty
concerning whether the US would comply with further
WTO and North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA) rulings, given its track record of poor compli-
ance up to that point). The settlement in question would
be hard to explain if there were no legal rules at all con-
straining the ability of the United States to impose trade
restrictions on imports of Canadian lumber (and certainly
inexplicable on realist terms since the US is the far greater
power), but equally inexplicable (in its details at least) if
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Canada had confidence that its legal claims would result in
US compliance. Thus international legal rules can produce
distinctive effects, and shape behavior, on account of uncer-
tainty about compliance.
In a very different context, that of the international legal
duty to punish crimes against humanity, recently reaffirmed
by the ICJ in the Bosnia v. Serbia case, the increasing like-
lihood of such prosecutions given the creation of an inter-
national criminal court may well affect peace or regime
transition bargains between parties to a conflict, for
instance making it more difficult or less plausible to use
amnesties as a bargaining chip for acceptance of a peaceful,
negotiated transition. On the other hand, with the ICC in
the background now, and its ability to enforce international
criminal law during an ongoing conflict, more cautious or
restrained behavior by some of the participants in the con-
flict may result, and this could actually make a transitional
bargain easier. In other words, the effects of international
criminal law on transitional or peace settlements in con-
flicts are likely to be complex. But these effects do not even
come into focus if one centers the analysis on effects on
‘compliance’ with the duty to prosecute and ⁄ or the duty to
cooperate with the ICC for instance.
• As already noted, international law can produce ‘ultra-
compliance’, by which we mean it can have normative
effects that are greater or more powerful or different than
what may be desired or consistent with the values or inten-
tionality that might plausibly be attributed to the ‘creators’
of the norms. Because of interpretative uncertainty and
asymmetries of information, governments have been able to
invoke international legal rules to justify policy directions,
even where alternative policies could be defended under
reasonable interpretations of those rules. This has especially
been the case with trade liberalization agreements, such as
the WTO treaties, where many of the obligations in ques-
tion are accompanied by exceptions provisions that allow a
wide range of legitimate policy interventions. In the case of
intellectual property rights, the United States government
and the pharmaceutical industry convinced many govern-
ments and nongovernmental actors that the WTO Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs)
agreement compulsory licensing exception from patent
rights was largely unusable, eventually giving rise to the
need for a negotiated text to clarify this matter.
Similarly, international human rights and humanitarian
law has been deployed to justify to varying degrees and
may have actually spurred forceful interventions in, for
instance, Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq; while at the same
time, in the case of Afghanistan and Iraq, such interven-
tions appear themselves to have undermined human rights
and humanitarian values and objectives to some extent,
especially given the impact on civilian populations. The
concept of ‘compliance’ simply does not capture the extre-
mely significant complexity and tension in the countervail-
ing normative effects here: a single act can be seen from
the perspective of an attempt to enforce compliance with a
given norm (‘humanitarian intervention’) but also, as a vio-
lation of it (where there are disproportionate effects on civ-
ilians, for instance). This was raised regarding NATO
intervention in Kosovo, is being raised now regarding the
ongoing casualties in Afghanistan and, unquestionably, is
at stake in the deteriorating sequence of events on the
ground in Iraq which has further delegitimized the human-
itarian ⁄human rights case for intervention.
• During the cold war the Soviet bloc accepted through
the Helsinki Accord basic international human rights
norms. It came as little surprise to many observers that
hardly any compliance with these norms actually followed
their acceptance by the eastern countries. But non-compli-
ance had an important effect: it provided a focus for dissi-
dent movements and served to further delegitimize the
Soviet bloc regimes, arguably hastening the end of commu-
nism. Having accepted human rights norms in Helsinki,
the states in question could no longer plausibly dismiss
such norms as western or bourgeois capitalist ideology
(Thomas, 2001).8
3. Thinking about the broader meaning(s) in an
expanded international law discourse
Broadening our understanding of the real world effects of
international law beyond the notion of ‘compliance’ is a
valuable exercise but there is at least one sense in which it
will not satisfy the realists ⁄ skeptics any more than compli-
ance studies. In the case of Goldsmith and Posner at least,
they ask for further proof that the effects in question result
from the character of the norms as law. For instance,
humanitarianism as a political ideology or morality might
have similar effects, even if not packaged as human rights
and humanitarian law. But as Goldsmith and Posner rec-
ognize, this would then cause us to ask why states invest
resources in translating these norms into a legal form.
Their answer is that, at least in some contexts, the use of
the language of law communicates a level of ‘seriousness’ to
a commitment that may have consequences for how other
actors respond in their own behavior and the reputational
consequences of reneging on these commitments.
A different answer, more pertinent in their view to
explaining international human rights ‘law’, is that states
tend to want to justify their actions in universalist terms,
and the language of law is particularly amenable to this,
given its ‘formal’ character (Goldsmith and Posner, 2006,
pp. 182–184). States need to water down their rhetoric to
appeal to more and more audiences and ‘law’ that does not
(in principle) have such a content tied to particular reli-
gious, moral or civilizational outlooks serves this purpose
well.
Perhaps Goldsmith and Posner are right that the resort
to ‘law’ has significance in defining what is common, a set
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of norms that is public and capable of expression and
rationalization in general terms. Beyond these formal quali-
ties of ‘law’, however, the legacy of the Second World War
and more recently of the cold war has associated the ‘rule
of law’ with a set of thicker, more substantive values:
limited government, objective and impartial treatment of
individuals by the state, lack of arbitrariness generally, the
rejection of open-ended struggle and violence, and decent
and bearable order.9 In many societies, belief in the capac-
ity of politics and ⁄or economics to guide solutions to basic
global problems has eroded. In these circumstances, ‘law’
has enough positive resonance, especially as public law, to
have become a preferred vocabulary for social order and for
legitimating decisions of governance.
Unlike Goldsmith and Posner on the one hand, and
international law ‘utopians’ on the other, we worry not so
much that international law boils down to ineffective or
largely meaningless (in real world terms) rhetoric but rather
that instead it has, in a range of contexts, been all too
effective. In altering the focus and agenda of states and
nonstate actors in dealing with conflict and post-conflict
transitions, international law may have raised expectations
too high that where politics and economics, and for that
matter moral idealism, have failed to solve enduring human
problems, law will succeed. We have already given one very
vivid example of such arguably excessive expectations,
namely the hopes pinned on international criminal justice
for successful post-conflict transitions and, even more so,
for bringing about a world free of dehumanizing conflicts.
The messy and contingent business of brokering political
deals between groups and factions and of economic recon-
struction10 has become less glamorous than that of trying
and punishing the ‘villains’ (however worthy and justified
in itself).
In sum, it may well be true as an abstract matter that it
is not only or exclusively legal normativity that would be
capable of producing effects of the kind we have identified
in this article, and that at other times and places other
forms of normativity might serve similar functions in inter-
national order (religious, moral, political norms, for
instance). But such an essentializing, timeless claim on
behalf of law as a distinctive type of normativity is hardly
necessary to defend the proposition that international law
matters in all kinds of ways for us, here and now.11 Fur-
ther, as Liam Murphy has argued in a recent article, a
careful examination of debates about the ‘concept’ of law
shows the extreme difficulty or perhaps impossibility of
drawing stable unambiguous boundaries between ‘law’ and
other kinds of normativity (Murphy, 2008, p. 1088). The
extraordinary range of normative effects generated by inter-
national law may well be a product of our distinctive his-
torical situation, just as realist or national interest-based
approaches to the right conduct of international relations
may understandably have been a dominant frame at other
times, such as during the cold war.
Nevertheless, there are those, such as Goldsmith and
Posner, who assume that there is a timeless framework for
international relations whereby states always turn to moral-
ity and ⁄or law to justify or explain their actions, but it is
self-interest that motivates these actions. In fact this is an
even more radical challenge to the notion that international
law matters, or at least matters a lot (of course, Goldsmith
and Posner have to admit that rhetoric performs some func-
tion, otherwise states would not invest in it). On this view,
the basic facts of war and peace, who is powerful and who
is not in the international system, are determined or prede-
termined by self-interested behavior, and so whatever justi-
ficatory rhetoric may exist at a given time, it does not alter
or transform those facts. Indeed, the very structure of this
argument further indicates why studies of compliance,
however methodologically sound, cannot put to bed, as it
were, skepticism about whether international law matters.
Even a very well-designed regression analysis cannot test
for the internal motivation that generates a given behav-
ior.12 The question of whether and to what extent particu-
lar state behaviors are generated by considerations of justice
or interest, or some mix thereof, has been a matter of
moral-philosophical speculation at least since Thucydides.
Analytically, however, we emphasize a difficulty with the
role of self-interest in the skeptical theory of Goldsmith
and Posner, to which we alluded earlier: it is incoherent on
their rational choice view of domestic politics to define a
state’s self-interest as exogenous to the preferences of its
citizens. Yet, citizens may care for international law for
different reasons than those adduced by Goldsmith and
Posner in the case of states, in reality political leaders of
states – namely justificatory rhetoric. Indeed, if citizens did
not care about justice, it would be unclear why states would
need to invest in such rhetoric: who would they hope to
persuade? For if states are aware that other states like
themselves act only from self-interest, not from the consid-
erations advanced in their justificatory rhetoric, they would
certainly not be investing in the rhetoric in the hope of
persuading other states or, more precisely, their political
leaders.
Conclusions
Moving beyond ‘compliance’ as a central concept of inter-
national legal theory and inquiry opens up new horizons,
or at least suggests new emphases in international legal
scholarship and a recasting of certain of the predominant
debates. First of all, empirical inquiry or theoretical specu-
lation as to how much ‘compliance’ there is with respect to
international law, and how and why it happens, cannot as
such play much of a role in the debate about whether
international law is ‘law’ or what it contributes to global
order that some other non-legal discourse – cosmopolitan
moralism, for example – would not contribute. What one
needs is much more reflection on those properties of ‘law’
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that it possesses which make international law distinctive
as a mode of discourse in international order, and then
to see the effects of international law through such an
understanding. This could give new purchase on some old
puzzles such as the meaning and rationale of ‘soft law’; it
may be that ‘soft law’ is effective, for example, because it
possesses the relevant or desirable ‘law’ characteristics for
the purposes in question (transparency, generality, connec-
tion to common or widely shared norms and practices),
while not itself possessing the ‘bindingness’ characteristic
(see Kelly and Karmel, 2009). Furthermore, an implication
of going beyond compliance is a great deal more attention
to interpretation as the manner in which international law
creates effects in the world. Interpretation is pervasively
determinative of what happens to legal rules when they are
out in the world; and yet ‘compliance’ studies begin with
the notion that to look at effects, we start with an assumed
stable and agreed meaning to a rule, and whether it is
complied with or obeyed, so understood. Standard search
techniques reveal a large and burgeoning literature on
‘compliance’ and a general dearth of literature on ‘interpre-
tation’ as central for international legal inquiry: to under-
stand properly the working of international law in the
world would probably entail reversing that emphasis.
Notes
We had the opportunity to present versions of this essay at the Uni-
versite´ de Paris ⁄NYU ⁄Cardozo conference on constitutionalism and
globalization, the International Studies Association annual meeting
2008, the IILJ International Legal Theory Colloquium and Hauser
Scholars Forum at NYU, and Fordham Law School. Our thanks to
participants on those occasions for helpful comments, and especially to
Benedict Kingsbury, Joseph Weiler, Tom Lee and Cathy Powell, and
also to Claire Kelly for very useful suggestions on a later draft.
1. See the case of H. L. A. Hart, discussed below.
2. See for a recent inventory of laws that are underenforced and
often uncomplied with in the US, Wu, 2007.
3. It would also be at odds with sophisticated social science about
why people actually do obey the law; see for example, Tyler, 2006.
Tyler found that a sense of legitimacy of the law is a more impor-
tant factor than fear of punishment in most people’s law-abiding
behavior, and that there is a strong link between procedural justice
and legitimacy.
4. See the socialization theory of Jinks and Goodman, 2003.
5. With respect to enhanced legalization in the WTO, Joseph Weiler
notes: ‘Whether the shift in legal paradigm has been a victory for
the Rule of Law or merely a victory for the rule of lawyers is a
very serious matter on which the jury is still out. There are some
very thoughtful actors and observers who are seriously wondering
whether the ‘‘historical deal’’ has truly been beneficial to some of
the deeper objectives of the WTO such as establishing stability
and ‘‘peaceful economic relations’’ ’ (Weiler, 2000, p. 4).
6. See Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1, Appeals Judgment, Inter-
national Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 15 July 1999.
7. Joint and Separate Opinion of Judge McDonald and Judge Voh-
rah, Erdemovic, Case No. IT-96-22-A, at para. 75.
8. Thanks to Claire Kelly for useful thoughts on the distinction
between acceptance of a norm and compliance with it.
9. Some of these elements are present in Kingsbury’s understanding
of ‘publicness’ as a key feature of law, of central significance for
the meaning of law in the context of global administrative law.
See Kingsbury, 2009.
10. In these particular respects, we see merit in David Kennedy’s con-
cerns about the apolitical or purportedly transpolitical outlook of
humanitarian jurists. See Kennedy, 2004.
11. Interestingly, in the Minos, Plato has Socrates define the relevant
question that begins the dialogue as ‘What is law for us?’ This
evokes the possibility that the very character of ‘law’ is such that
the ‘what is’ question cannot be posed outside the context of
actual practices of law, or the givenness of law as a historical prac-
tice (and ⁄ or, perhaps, divine revelation) is the phenomenon to
which analysis must be addressed.
12. Thus, in the domestic law context, studies of what motivates people
to obey the law need to rely on survey tools. See Tyler, 2006. Since
especially today international law ‘compliance’ engages in fact a
wide range of actors – a fact, as we observe in this article, often
ignored in the literature, which still in large measure focuses on
behavior of ‘states’ as if they were autonomous, unique agents –
such studies of motivation in the international law context would
need to survey the various actors in question, both within the state
apparatus formally responsible for determining compliance-related
decisions on behalf of the state, and others to whom the rules are
addressed in part directly (soldiers who may be personally criminally
liable for war crimes, etc.). Some of the best literature, such as Janet
Levit (2004; examining rules on concessional trade finance), does,
at least anecdotally, attempt to grasp the complexity with which the
motivations of different actors lead to compliance outcomes with
respect to international legal norms.
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